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Why the BJP won 
Much of the credit for the decisive nature of the BJP’s 
victory has to go to India’s newly-appointed Prime Min-
ister, Narendra Modi. When the BJP announced Modi as 
its prime ministerial candidate in 2013, there were many 
who were sceptical of his ability to reach out to voters be-
yond the party’s traditional catchment area of northern 
and western India. The 2002 communal riots in Gujarat, 
which happened under Modi’s watch, were a serious con-
cern for many, particularly minorities. But not only did he 
enthuse voters across India, including eastern and south-
ern India where the BJP is not traditionally strong, but 
also helped the party win an unprecedented number of 
seats from the north and west.
 Though in terms of seats it was a strong mandate 
for the BJP, in terms of vote share the party won just 31 
percent of the total vote. Indeed, this is the lowest vote 
share for a single-party majority in the Lok Sabha. On 
the other hand, the Congress won 19 percent of the votes 
and only 44 seats, far less than what the BJP had won 
in 2009 with roughly a similar vote share. But the first-
The convincing victory of the BJP in the 2014 Indian general elections came 
as a surprise to many. Most opinion polls, which had predicted a win for the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that 
it leads, had not anticipated the scale of the party’s victory. The BJP alone 
won 282 seats and the NDA 336 out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower 
house of Parliament. Two things stand out in the verdict. This is the first time 
in 30 years that a party won a majority on its own; this is also the worst-ever 
showing by India’s grand old party, the Indian National Congress, which won 
a mere 44 seats, 70 less than its previous all-time low in 1999.
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 Second, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) was facing severe anti-incumbency on various 
counts, including high inflation, a raft of corruption scan-
dals and policy paralysis, and the BJP seemed to many 
voters the only credible, national alternative. A demor-
alised Congress ran a lackadaisical campaign which was 
a pale shadow of the BJP’s. It helped the BJP that India’s 
corporates as well as some media houses were heavily 
backing Modi. 
 Third, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the 
ideological lynchpin of the Hindu nationalist movement 
and an outfit which was banned in the early years of in-
dependent India, pulled out all stops to get Modi elected. 
Though Modi, a former RSS volunteer, has had his run-ins 
with his parent organisation, it was the RSS which was 
instrumental in getting Modi selected as prime ministe-
rial candidate and then backing him to the hilt.
 Fourth, many had felt that the minority Muslim com-
munity’s mistrust of Modi would prove to be an obstacle 
for the BJP. However, the vote of the Muslims, who make 
up 14 percent of India's population but are rarely a major-
ity in any constituency, got divided among parties con-
testing against the BJP. This was especially true in Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar where the BJP won most of the seats 
where there is a heavy concentration of Muslim voters.
The Congress debacle
Even though nobody expected the Congress to return to 
power, most pre-poll surveys had predicted around 100 
seats for the party. That it did considerably worse indicates 
that the party got little right in its campaign. While anti-
incumbency was a huge factor, the Congress could neither 
defend its achievements over the past decade, such as the 
employment guarantee scheme for the rural poor, nor con-
nect to young voters. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
was virtually absent from the election campaign. The 
Congress’ chief campaigner Rahul Gandhi also contrasted 
poorly against the oratorical skills and charisma of Modi.
past-the post-system, coupled with the fragmentation of 
the anti-BJP vote in many constituencies, resulted in an 
extraordinarily high vote to seat conversion for the BJP.
 Among the factors crucial to the BJP’s success was 
the presidential-style campaign run by Modi. Perhaps 
the only other prime ministerial aspirant in India who 
ran a similar campaign was Indira Gandhi in the 1971 
election. Given the fragmentation of the polity there were 
doubts about the efficacy of such a campaign. But Modi 
was helped by the fact that the electorate, particularly 
younger voters, was receptive to his message.
 There were several reasons why Modi’s campaign 
was so successful. First, Modi spoke the language of 
development and governance, rather than the divisive 
agenda of Hindutva (or Hinduness), which appealed to 
voters. The BJP’s campaign was extremely well pack-
aged and funded, using both the traditional and social 
media to tremendous effect. Modi, who addressed some 
450 rallies across India during the campaign period, 
also used innovative methods such as hologram technol-
ogy to address multiple rallies without actually being 
physically present. This allowed Modi to transcend the 
BJP’s traditional vote base of upper caste Hindus and its 
regional limitations.
 On the ground, however, the BJP worked actively to 
consolidate the Hindu vote. This paid dividend in states 
like Uttar Pradesh, which sends 80 MPs to the Lok 
Sabha, and Bihar which elects 40 MPs. Both states saw 
communal violence in the run-up to the polls which pos-
sibly helped the Hindu vote consolidate in favour of the 
BJP and enabled it to win an astounding 93 out of 120 
seats compared to only 22 seats in the 2009 election. 
The BJP was also able to woo lower castes, who tradition-
ally do not vote for the BJP, by consistently emphasising 
Modi’s lower-caste background; it also made crucial alli-
ances with parties such as the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), 
which has considerable support among the lower castes, 
in Bihar.
3matic decline which symbolised the state of the party 
in this election.
 The elections were also a clear indication of the with-
ering away of the Congress’ grassroots organisation in 
most states. Unlike the BJP which has strong state lead-
ers, the Congress has hardly anyone of real stature in 
the states. Even in states such as Karnataka, Himachal 
Pradesh and Uttarakhand, where the Congress had won 
Assembly elections in the recent past and formed the gov-
ernment, it performed far worse than the BJP.
 Just as the election verdict has strengthened Modi’s 
hand, it has discredited the dynastic hold over the Con-
gress. The leadership of Sonia and Rahul Gandhi has been 
found wanting not only during the election campaign, but 
also for the entire second term of the Congress-led United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. However given 
the dynamics within the Congress, it is unlikely to go in 
for radical changes even after a defeat of such magnitude.
 Some of the pre-poll strategies of the Congress back-
fired. This was particularly true of the southern state of 
Andhra Pradesh where the Congress had won 33 of the 
42 seats in the 2009 general elections. Subsequently the 
Congress had suffered a split in the state with the son 
of former Congress chief minister and strongman, Y.S. 
Rajasekhara Reddy, forming his own party the YSR 
Congress. The Congress hoped to counter this by bi-
furcating Andhra Pradesh and benefitting electorally 
in the newly-created state of Telangana. But that ploy 
boomeranged with a local outfit, the Telangana Rash-
tra Samithi (TRS), winning big in Telangana. In the 
other unit of Andhra Pradesh, popularly referred to as 
Seemandhra, the Congress was predictably decimated 
with the regional parties, Telugu Desam (which sealed 
a last-minute alliance with the BJP) and YSR Congress, 
sharing the spoils. The Congress managed to win only 
two seats in the entire state of Andhra Pradesh, a dra-
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Figure 1: Percentage of votes won by the Congress and the BJP: 1989 – 2014
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to another state is a reason for celebration for the party, 
the inability to win a single seat in Delhi would be a cause 
for worry with Assembly elections most likely due in the 
state later this year.
Challenges for the new government
The strong mandate for the BJP has ensured that Modi 
will not be constrained by demanding regional allies, 
in the manner the UPA was, as well as detractors from 
within his own party. He has thus been relatively free 
to appoint a team of his own liking. With fewer allies to 
appease, Modi has expectedly downsized the size of his 
cabinet to 45 from a 77-member Cabinet during the UPA’s 
second term. It is expected though that the cabinet will 
be expanded at a later stage since several ministers are 
currently holding multiple portfolios.
 The union cabinet, which was sworn in on May 26, 
has some familiar faces who had served in the NDA 
government under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpay-
ee from 1999 to 2004. The two most senior ministers, 
Arun Jaitley and Rajnath Singh, are seen to be close to 
Modi. Jaitley holds the crucial portfolios of finance and 
defence; the BJP president Rajnath Singh has been given 
home. Sushma Swaraj, who has not always seen eye to 
eye with Modi, has been given the external affairs port-
folio. Some appointments have raised eyebrows because 
of the inexperience of the ministers. A common thread 
is that most of the crucial ministries have gone to Modi 
loyalists which means that the prime minister will exert 
tight control over them. It also indicates a larger role for 
the Prime Minister’s Office.
 The two notable omissions in the cabinet were L.K. Ad-
vani, who was effectively the number two in the Vajpayee 
government holding the position of deputy prime minis-
ter and home minister, and Murli Manohar Joshi who was 
the human resource development minister under Vajpay-
ee. Both were kept out ostensibly on the grounds that no 
person above 75 would be appointed to the cabinet. The 
The regional players
The combined vote share of the BJP and the Congress 
was just over 50 percent, which meant that almost half 
the voters supported regional parties. This showed the 
continuing strength of the regional parties. Among the 
regional parties that did exceptionally well were the All 
India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) in 
Tamil Nadu with 37 seats, West Bengal’s Trinamool Con-
gress with 34 and the Biju Janata Dal in Odisha with 20. 
In Andhra Pradesh three regional parties – the Telugu 
Desam, the TRS and the YSR Congress – won a bulk of 
the seats.
 Some of the most surprising results, however, came 
from Uttar Pradesh where the ruling Samajwadi Party 
(SP) won only 5 seats and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 
none. In what was a four-cornered contest in most seats, 
the vagaries of the first past the post system with its win-
ner-takes-all logic hurt both parties. The BSP won over 
19 percent of the vote but had nothing to show for by way 
of seats. In the 2009 election both parties had done well 
with the SP winning 23 seats and the BSP 20.
 In Bihar, too, the results were dramatically different 
from last time. The ruling Janata Dal (United), led by chief 
minister Nitish Kumar, which pulled out of an alliance 
with the BJP in 2013, got burnt winning only two seats 
compared to 20 in 2009. The LJP, which had not won a 
single seat in 2009 but tied up with the BJP this time, won 
an impressive six seats.
 Two other pre-poll allies of the BJP had mixed show-
ings. The Shiv Sena in Maharashtra improved from 11 
seats in 2009 to 18 in this election; the Shiromani Akali 
Dal in Punjab, however, won four seats which was exactly 
the same number it had won in 2009.
 Finally, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) or the Common 
Man’s Party, which had sparked worldwide interest after 
it formed a short-lived state government in Delhi in 2013, 
won only four seats. Surprisingly all four seats were from 
Punjab and none from Delhi. While the spread of the AAP 
5 A low-hanging fruit would be to put in place a national 
goods and services tax to replace the multiple state-level 
taxes. This would bring in more money to the government 
coffers. But a bigger challenge for Modi is the long-term 
structural reform of the Indian economy which would 
involve lowering the government deficit, trimming sub-
sidies and radically reforming state-run entities in the 
power, coal and gas sectors as well as the railways, which 
is India’s largest employer. To do this Modi is likely to face 
several obstacles, including protests from the beneficia-
ries of subsidies, a stubborn and often corrupt bureaucra-
cy and labour unions.
 An even bigger challenge is the creation of employ-
ment opportunities for India’s youth — 10 million of them 
enter the job market every year — many of whom have 
voted for Modi. This requires turning India into a labour-
intensive manufacturing hub. Since manufacturing con-
tributes to only 11 percent of jobs in India, it’s a tall task 
for Modi. There are several steps that he would have to 
take, none of them easy in a complex federal polity such 
as India. Two important ones are making land acquisi-
real reason probably is that both the veteran leaders were 
not keen on Modi’s selection in 2013 as the BJP’s prime 
ministerial candidate. Advani reportedly wanted the Lok 
Sabha Speaker’s post, but that too was denied to him. 
 The new government has to grapple with several chal-
lenges. On the economic front, Modi has inherited a stag-
nant economy, high inflation, stalled projects and policy 
paralysis. Topping Modi’s list of priorities would be pull-
ing India from its present under 5 percent growth rate 
up to something close to its peak 8–9 percent, and tam-
ing inflation. The former requires higher levels of invest-
ment, particularly in infrastructure, which had sharp-
ly tapered off during the second term of the UPA. During 
his tenure as Gujarat chief minister Modi had built up a 
business-friendly reputation. This is likely to encourage 
investment, both domestic and foreign. The stock markets 
have already cheered the election results and the appoint-
ment of Modi as Prime Minister. On inflation, Modi has to 
take a call on whether to back the tight monetary policy of 
central bank governor, Raghuram Rajan, who has resisted 
cutting interest rates. 
Table 1: The new government’s top priorities
Source: Ronojoy Sen
Priority Proposed Action
Contain infl ation which stood 
at 8.5 percent in April 2014
Remove supply-side constraints; address farm pricing and procurement; 
increase investment in agriculture; contingency plan for sub-normal monsoon
Increase growth rate which was 
under 5 percent in 2013–14
Encourage FDI; a single-window system of clearances; promote labour-intensive 
manufacturing; liberalise FDI in defence production
Improve infrastructure Infrastructure development programmes for high-speed rail, roads and airports; 
fast track public-private partnerships; increase electricity generation
Tackle corruption Follow up black money with foreign governments; clear rules for allocation of coal, 
minerals and telecom spectrum; use social media for participatory governance
Skills development Set up massive online open courses; Indian Institutes of 
Technology and Indian Institutes of Management in every state
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had allies to contend with, shows that the BJP has tended to 
become centrist in power. But Modi has also said nothing 
significant, except a mention of the welfare of minorities 
in his maiden speech in Parliament, to assuage the senti-
ments and fears of minorities. Indeed, one of the worry-
ing aspects of the BJP’s convincing victory is that not a 
single Muslim MP has been elected on a BJP ticket.
 It might not be easy too for Modi to ignore the RSS, 
an organisation in which he was schooled, and which 
mobilised its considerable cadre to ensure the BJP’s win. 
Though the RSS is not involved in day to day administra-
tion it plays a significant role in major decisions within 
the BJP. Modi might also have to do a balancing act be-
tween policies, advocated by allied organisations like 
the Swadeshi Jagran Manch, which support protectionist 
policies, and big corporates who have invested so heavily 
in ensuring the BJP’s victory. The BJP’s traditional sup-
port base of small traders too might impose restrictions 
on economic policy. The BJP has already indicated it is 
against FDI in multi-brand retail.
Conclusion
Within days of assuming government Modi has issued a 
list of ten priorities. Most of these, such as transparency 
in government or addressing the economy’s concerns, are 
generic. India’s president in his address (which lists gov-
ernment policy and is approved by the cabinet) to both 
Houses of Parliament on June 9 identified controlling food 
inflation as the government’s top-most priority. Other 
ambitious goals of the government are to provide hous-
ing to all Indians by 2022. In his initial days as prime 
minister, Modi has taken a CEO-like approach. In what 
was probably a first, Modi met senior bureaucrats of the 
different ministries and departments and assured then 
that he would back their decisions. He has also asked all 
minsters to prepare a 100-day agenda. 
 While the flurry of activity is meant to signal the in-
tent of the government, the biggest test before Modi is to 
tion easier for setting up industry and easing labour laws. 
With a majority in the Lok Sabha, the BJP government 
will have no problem in pushing through legislation in 
the lower house. But in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house 
of Parliament) the BJP is well short of a majority, which 
will require it to reach out to regional parties.
 On foreign policy, the BJP government has begun on 
a bright note. In an unexpected move Modi invited the 
elected heads of India’s immediate neighbours, including 
Afghanistan, to attend his swearing-in. All except the 
Bangladeshi prime minister, who sent a representative, 
attended. Most importantly, Pakistani Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif not only attended the event but also held 
talks with Modi. Though largely symbolic, the meeting 
signalled intent on Modi’s part to talk to Pakistan despite 
the BJP’s hardline stance on acts of terrorism originating 
from Pakistan. The focus on India’s immediate neighbour-
hood is evident from the fact that Modi’s first bilateral trip 
in mid-June was to Bhutan and foreign minister Swaraj’s 
to Bangladesh.
 In the days to come India’s foreign policy will be test-
ed with regard to the United States, which until recently 
was unwilling to grant Modi a visa. Modi is scheduled to 
meet US President Barrack Obama when he attends the 
United Nations General Assembly in New York in Septem-
ber. With China, India’s largest trading partner, Modi en-
joys a good relationship having visited Beijing four times 
as chief minister. Despite a long-standing border dispute, 
the Chinese sense economic opportunities in India and 
sent its foreign minister Wang Yi for bilateral talks with 
Swaraj in early June. 
 Finally, Modi will also be closely watched on how 
much he decides to push the Hindutva agenda of the 
BJP and if he is willing to rein in the more radical Hindu 
nationalist organisations. During electioneering Modi 
largely eschewed the Hindu nationalist rhetoric and fo-
cused on governance, which was the theme of his cam-
paign. The record of the Vajpayee government, which 
7that Modi and the central government can do. As of now, 
the BJP is in power on its own or with allies in seven of 
India’s 29 states. It will aim to win in important states 
such as Maharashtra, Delhi, Haryana and Bihar that are 
expected to go to election over the next year. This would 
make it easier for Modi to push through federal schemes.
Having given Modi a convincing mandate, the Indian 
voter is going to be demanding. Modi’s durability will de-
pend on how quickly he can deliver on the promises that 
he has made.
manage the sky-high expectations of those who voted him 
to power. Modi’s supporters believe that he will be able to 
govern India, at least on the economic front, in the way he 
has Gujarat. Leaving aside the contestation over Modi’s 
record in Gujarat, which has clocked impressive growth 
but has been average on social development indicators, 
there are concerns about whether his autocratic style of 
government will translate well for all of India. It is not 
just, however, a question of Modi’s style of governance. 
In India’s federal system there are only so many things 
Figure 2: Election results 2014
543 seats
Source: Election Commission of India
 Bharatiya Janata Party  282
 Indian National Congress 44
 All India Anna Dravida 
 Munnetra Kazhagam  37
 All India Trinamool Congress  34
 Biju Janata Dal  20
 Shiv Sena 18
 Telugu Desam Party 16
 Telangana Rashtra Samithi  11
 Communist Party 
 of India (Marxist) 9
 Yuvajana Sramika
 Rythu Congress Party  9
 Nationalist Congress Party  6
 Lok Jan Shakti Party 6
 Samajwadi Party   5
 Aam Aadmi Party 4
 Rashtriya Janata Dal 4
 Shiromani Akali Dal  4
 Other Parties
 (less than 4 seats) 34
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